Russell and Walker proposed different ways of constructing instants from events. As an explanation of "time as a continuum", Thomason favoured Walker's construction. The present paper shows that Russell's construction fares as well. To this end, a mathematical characterization problem is solved which corresponds to the characterization problem that Thomason solved with regard to Walker's construction. It is shown how to characterize those event structures (formally: interval orders) which, through Russell's construction of instants, become linear orders isomorphic to a given (or, deriving: to some-non-trivial ordered) real interval. As tools, separate characterizations for each of resulting (i) Dedekind completeness, (ii) separability, (iii) plurality of elements, (iv) existence of certain endpoints are provided. Denseness is characterized to replace Russell's erroneous attempt. Somewhat minimal non-constructive principles needed are exhibited.
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY.
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The problem the present paper is concerned with derives from Russell's [42, Lecture IV] attempt mathematically to construct "instants" of time from "events". Thomason's [46] paper starts almost the same way. According to Thomason, however, Russell 's construction has the disadvantage that it is difficult to see what assumptions about the temporal relationships among events will ensure that the instants constructed comprise a continuum, isomorphic to the real numbers. Thomason [46] thus presents an alternative way-due to the physicist A. G. Walker 1 -of constructing instants of time out of events. Thomason shows of some conditions on the temporal relationships of events that they do ensure instants of time, as constructed according to Walker, comprising a "continuum". 2 He then concludes that Walker's theory offers, as Russell's does not, a plausible explanation of time as a continuum.
The present paper shows (besides some by-products) how to single out those relations on sets of events which become order-isomorphic to the real numbers through Russell 's construction. More generally, it shows how to tell from such a relation whether the resulting order is in a class (closed under isomorphisms) of intervals of the real numbers 3 -an interval being open in each, one, or no direction; ordered by the relation of being less. 4 At least one of the characterizations presented might be considered a "refutation" of Thomason's claim denying explanatory power of Russell's theory. 5 The keys to these characterizations are (i ) a sufficient condition on events and their temporal relationships for Russellian time being dense 6 , due to N. Wiener [49, pp. 446f.] or to Russell; 7 (ii ) a characterization, due to Russell, of those events that get first or, resp., last instants by his construction. The sufficient condition according to (i) is modified here to obtain a necessary and suffient one.
The main results are stated in Section 7. The sections which precede Section 7 merely explain the notions used in the latter. In proving claims afterwards, I keep books on what non-constructive choice or maximality principles (the very axiom of choice or something weaker) I use. It will even be shown that one of the characterizing conditions can be used as an alternative to any such principle in the relevant context. Some proofs merely replace existing Principia-notation proofs and thus may be helpful to at least some readers. The last section comments on some remaining aspects of continuumlikeness of time.
2 Indeed, the conditions he presents are necessary as well. Kleinknecht [26] does something very similar, but presents a pair of conditions which is only sufficient, not necessary. 3 A real interval as defined below, i.e. 4 This extends Thomason's and Walker's scope to something of which admittedly physicists will hardly acknowledge any use of-see Section 4 below.
5 Subsection 9.4 will discuss this statement.-Maybe even Thomason's "difficulty claim" is refuted. 6 As defined in Corollary 1 below. 7 I have had some troubles in distinguishing Russell's from N. Wiener's credits. According to the footnote of [49, p. 441 ], Wiener (the well-known mathematician who later founded "cybernetics") investigated the matter on Russell's suggestion. Indeed, at that time Wiener was a student under Russell at Cambridge University ( [31, pp. 45ff.], [18] ). Thus, while Wiener explicitly attributes the definition of "instants" under consideration here and another notion to Russell, it is no surprise when further credits are difficult to track. Moreover, the first edition of Russell's [42] appeared in the same year as Wiener's [49] .
2 Relations, linearity, and real intervals.
Already in explaining my goal I will come across several binary relations; so I declare my general conventions concerning them in advance.
When X, Y are any sets and R ⊆ X × Y is some binary relation between them, I will write x R y instead of x, y ∈ R. Considering some number R 1 , . . . , R n of binary relations, I will write x 1 R 1 x 2 R 2 x 3 . . . x n R n x n+1 meaning that x 1 R 1 x 2 , x 2 R 2 x 3 , . . . and x n R n x n+1 . 8 A related set is an ordered pair X, R where R is a binary relation on X. 9 If R is no subset of X × X, X, R is shorthand for X, R ∩ (X × X) . Sometimes I will abuse language by talking of elements and cardinality of related sets X, R as if I would talk of X. Related sets X, R , X , R are isomorphic (to each other), if there is a one-to-one map φ from X onto X such that for any x, y ∈ X x R y if and only if φ(x) R φ(y).
A least element in a related set X, R is an x ∈ X such that x R y for any other y ∈ X. If instead y R x, then x is a greatest element.
By a (strict) linear order on some set Y I understand a transitive binary relation R on Y such that for any x, y ∈ Y exactly one of x R y, y R x and x = y holds (this mixes irreflexivity, connectedness, and even, redundantly, asymmetry). 10 In this case, I will call any related set X, R such that X ⊆ Y a linearly ordered set, or, for short, a loset. 11 R, < will denote the set of all real numbers linearly ordered by the binary relation of being less. By a real interval I will understand a set I ⊆ R such that if s, t ∈ I and s < r < t then r ∈ I.
I am going to call a real interval open if it contains neither a least nor a greatest element, half-open if it contains a least or a greatest element but not 8 Formulas like these and others are just meant to be shorthand for English mathematical expressions; they are not meant to refer to expressions of a formal language from the realm of metamathematics. However, metamathematical questions may rise eventually, and one will then be able easily to realize that some condition discussed can be formalized in some first-order language, e.g. 9 R is a binary relation on X, if it is one between X and X. 10 Now that [40] is a relevant reference, it should be noted that transitivity here-as will be usual for many readers-means that x R z whenever x R y and y R z; it should not be confused with what in [40] and other contexts is denoted by the same term. In these contexts, 'transitive' could have been replaced by 'homogeneous'.-By the trichotomy condition, the union of domain and codomain of R is the only set on which a given binary relation R can be a linear order.
11 While 'poset' is a standard term in the literature on partially ordered sets, I have never seen this term 'loset'. For didactical reasons, however, I urgently need a short term. 'Chain' is short as well, but should work like 'antichain' and therefore does not fit.
both, and compact if it contains both a least and a greatest element (which may coincide). By a non-trivial real interval I understand a real interval having more than one element-which is the same as having the cardinality of R. Observe that being non-trivial is the same as being non-void in case of an open real interval and as having distinct borders in the case of a compact real interval, while all half-open intervals are non-trivial.
3 Some events, some Russellian instants.
For the remaining, I fix some non-void set E of so-called "events" and a binary relation P ⊆ E × E on it, the philosophical meaning of which is to be 'wholly precedes ' . Proofs of what is claimed on the few lines following are indicated in the first two subsections of Section 8.
An antichain (in E, P ) is a subset A of E such that for any two a, b ∈ A neither a P b nor b P a. A maximal antichain is an antichain that cannot be extended to another antichain by adding any non-void set of events. By the axiom of choice, any antichain can be extended to a maximal antichain, and as the empty set is an antichain, there is at least some maximal antichain. For the same time that E, P is fixed, let L be just the set of maximal antichains in E, P . By Russell's proposal, 12 the elements of L are instants of time as "constructed" from those "events" presented in E and from their temporal relationships encoded by P . (Therefore, it will be informal variables like s, t that range in L, while A, B, . . . will range over arbitrary subsets of E.)
The "order of time", then, is defined to be
for some a ∈ s and some b ∈ t }.
In "order notation" and "philosophical diction", s T t (only) for "instants" s, t in L just if some event a in s "wholly precedes" some event b in t. I furthermore fix that P be irreflexive (i.e., no event precede itself) and that for any events a, b, c, d, if a P b and c P d then a P d or c P b.
(I) ( E, P is now an interval order in the sense of [16] and [17] ; and I may use results from Wiener [49] , 13 who calls a P satisfying an equivalent pair of conditions a 'relation of complete sequence', as well as from Russell's [43] , who uses a triple of conditions equivalent to each of the previously mentioned pairs.) Reading (I) as 'if a wholly precedes b and c wholly precedes d, but c does not wholly precede b, then a wholly precedes d' may exhibit (I) to be a 'self-evident' feature of P if the latter is read as 'wholly precedes'. 14 This would render E, P quite a good starting point for philosophically justifying instants of time. In fact, in the situation of the hypothesis of the proposed reading, (i ) either b wholly precedes c, and then by "selfevident" transitivity of 'wholly precedes' a wholly precedes d; (ii ) or b and c have "something in common" which must be preceded by a and precede d, and this might be considered some "evidence" for a wholly preceding d. 15 By (I) and irreflexivity of P , the latter relation is transitive. Moreover, (I) ensures that T is a linear order on L [49, p. 445f.] . In this respect, T is an adequate mathematical reconstruction of temporal precedence between instants of time. Some aspects of adequacy, however, remain to be considered.
Core Task.
I am going to propose a few characterization problems to be solved, indicating them as 'questions'.
First compare the characterization problem that Thomason [46] deals with. He explains how Walker would construct, instead of L, T , another time ordering L , T from E, P . He then presents a necessary and sufficient condition on E, P for L , T being isomorphic to R, < . The anologous problem for L, T he considers 'difficult', viz., Question 1. When, in terms of E, P , is L, T isomorphic to R, < ?
Here, I am using 'when . . . ' to abridge something like 'What conditions on E, P are necessary and sufficient for E, P being isomorphic to R, < ?', and similarly below. These questions are, admittedly, not perfectly precise, but I am not attempting to explicate the notion of 'characterization' in this paper; it will suffice to present convincing solutions to the problems, however "ill-posed" the latter may be. We will encounter solutions for other characterization problems by conditions which could be formalized as firstorder sentences in a language interpretable in E, P . It may be no surprise in connection with "the continuum", however, that the main characterizing conditions are not first-order, but stipulate a countable set of objects from E, P having a certain property (cf., e.g., [35, Theorem 2 
.1]).
Variants of Question 1 may be interesting from a physical, mathematical, or perhaps even philosophical point of view. First, one might really want an explanation of "time as a contiuum", but one might disagree with
Thomason as to what a continuum is. Indeed, the purportedly well-known order-type of "the continuum" that Cantor characterized in his celebrated [11] was actually that of the closed (i.e., compact) unit interval, and another notion of "continua", entailing topological compactness as well, was prominent in a branch of early topology, so-called curve theory (cf. Subsection 9.2). So (as some readers conclude immediately and others will see soon) a continuum may be-and has been-considered something essentially different to a structure comprising all the real numbers. Unlike the real numbers, it might have a first point, a last point, or both.
On the other hand, the question of what a or the continuum is might be considered too "theoretical", namely "only" of mathematical or even philosophical interest. It might be considered more important whether the construction renders time as it is used in physics. Indeed, physical textbooks seem to postulate that instants of time are just the same as real numbers. However, from the viewpoint of physical, relativistic cosmology (of General Relativity, i.e.) which prevails nowadays, astronomical observations indicate that not every real number corresponds to an instant of time (in the usual way): a 'Big Bang' is believed to have started time; and a final collapse of the universe is reckoned with to end time. 16 However, this reasoning may only lead to consider bounded open real intervals instead of all the real numbers, and this switch does not change anything at least order-theoretically or topologically. First or last instants which would make a difference seem to play no role in physics-you usually encounter open time intervals in textbooks, even the Big Bang has no starting instant of time. 17 Yet, some physicist might one day leave the herd.
So there may be some, if only little, reason to consider more general versions of Question 1. The additional answers will not need extra mathematical effort. From the results the reader may choose what he likes most. The 16 This, however, stems from the special role time is given in the mathematical rendering of how the universe seems to behave, and talking of "time" perhaps only makes sense when spacetime is a "product" of time and space in some special sense (I do not expect spacetime singularities of black holes that are formed eventually or that dissolve by a reasoning of Stephen Hawking [21] would deprive the picture of one time line for all "point" events of spacetime of use). Of course, in some "metaphysical" view "Time" could have existed earlier than the Big Bang and could since then somehow "interplay" with "mathematicalphysical time". Such a "metaphysical everexisting Time" would be of no empirical value, only, maybe, of some aesthetical one-if someone's taste behaves appropriately. What is most important here: such a "metaphysical Time outside of physical time" could not be reconstructed from "empirical" events! "Empirical" events occur after the Big Bang and before a final collapse and will therefore only detect the instants of-boundedphysical time.-Indeed, Walker's approach presented by [46] was part of justifying, by assumptions about simple observations, a mathematical model of the whole development of the universe according to General Relativity (cf. references in [46] ). The spacetimes according to this mathematical model are nowadays called 'Robertson-Walker spacetimes' (cf. [37, pp. 341ff .], e.g.). 17 Cf. footnote 16. reader may like to know something about "continua", and she may conceive of continua so that two of them are isomorphic to each other (like the open real intervals), or so that there are two or more isomorphism types of continua. E.g., a continuum might be viewed to be anything order-isomorphic to some non-trivial real interval. Consider
Question-Scheme 1*. When, in terms of E, P , is L, T isomorphic to I, < ?
This "scheme" produces one question for each real interval I. Question 1 is that example where I = R. The "scheme" represents readers with somewhat very "narrow" conceptions of continuumlikeness. As for an example of a broad conception, its answers enable answering Question 1 + . When, in terms of E, P , is L, T isomorphic to some I, < where I is a non-trivial real interval?
5 Via completeness and dense subsets.
The following is well known: 18 Fact 1. A related set is isomorphic to R, < if and only if it is a non-void, complete and separable loset having neither a least nor a greatest element.
To understand this, recall some definitions. Let X, R be some related set again.
A lower bound of some Y ⊆ X is an x ∈ X which is a least element of {x} ∪ Y (x may be element of Y ). A greatest lower bound of Y ⊆ X is a greatest element of the set of all lower bounds of Y . By analogy, an upper bound of Y is greatest element of the union of its singleton with Y , and a least upper bound is a least element of the set of all upper bounds. (If X, R is a loset, Y has at most one greatest lower or, resp., least upper bound, of course.) Now, X, R is complete if every non-void subset of X having a lower bound has a greatest such and every subset of X having an upper bound has a least such. 19 A set Y is dense in X, R if Y ⊆ X and for any two x, z ∈ X such that x R z there is some y ∈ Y such that x R y R z.
Finally, X, R is separable if there is a countable 20 subset of X being dense in X, R . 21 In view of Fact 1, and since L, T is a non-void loset anyway (by Section 3), we approach our goal by moving from Question 1 to Question 1 . When, in terms of E, P , is L, T complete and separable without least or greatest element? Question 1 can be splitted into the following questions, which will be dealt with separately from each other.
Question 2. When, in terms of E, P , is L, T complete?
Question 4a. When, in terms of E, P , has L, T a least element?
Question 4b. When, in terms of E, P , has L, T a greatest element?
To deal with Question Scheme 1*, Fact 1 can be generalized to arbitrary real intervals-taking some subtleties (as observed in Section 2) into account:
(a) Assume I is open. If I is empty, then I, < = ∅, ∅ , and this is the only related set isomorphic to I, < . Otherwise a related set is isomorphic to I, < if and only if it is a non-void complete and separable loset having neither a least nor a greatest element.
(b) If I contains a least element, but no greatest, [the other way round, resp.], a related set is isomorphic to I, < if and only if it is a complete and separable loset with 22 a least [greatest, resp.] and without greatest [least, resp.] element.
(c) Assume I is compact. 23 If I contains just one element, then a related set is isomorphic to I, < if and only if it is {x}, ∅ for some object x. Otherwise a related set is isomorphic to I, < if and only if it is a complete and separable loset with a least and a greatest element where the latter do not coincide. 24 20 By my understanding here, 'countable' does not imply 'infinite'. So some questions of cardinality can be discussed separately below. 21 So there are four types (with respect to order-isomorphisms) of nontrivial real intervals: open, half-open (two types), and compact-with-morethan-one-element. Questions 2, 3, 4a, and 4b suffice to recognize the first three cases for L, T (corresponding to cases (a) and (b) of Fact 1*) from looking at E, P . For recognizing the fourth case, it suffices to deal with the following final question.
Question 5. When, in terms of E, P , has L more than one element?
An obvious "answer-scheme" to Question-Scheme 1* arises, following the lines of Fact 1*. An answer to Question 1 + derives which may be considered a consequence of the following fact, which is entailed by Fact 1*.
Fact 1 + . A related set is isomorphic to I, < for some non-trivial real interval I if and only if it is a complete and separable loset having more than one element.
I am going to introduce further relations on the set E of events in order to state some conditions more succinctly than I could do without them. At the same time, some visualizing possible situations may be in order so that it is easier to understand what I mean.
Assume for a moment E is a three-element set {a, b, c} and P = { a, b }. horizontal strokes representing a and b so that a vertical stroke can be filled in right-hand to the horizontal stroke representing a and left-hand to the horizontal stroke which represents b.
By contrast, no vertical stroke would have two horizontal strokes on different sides such that one of them would represent a and the other would represent c. This holds for b in place of a, as well. Rather, c is "overlapping" a as well as b.
(By the way, {a, c} and {b, c} are antichains; maximal antichains, in fact, and the only ones. So they form the set L of instants of time, and we have {a, c} T {b, c}.) Furthermore, c "begins earlier than" b, "witnessed" by a overlapping c but wholly preceding b. Similarly, a "ends earlier than" c, "witnessed" by b overlapping c but being wholly preceded by a.
The above 'moment' (specializing E, P ) is over, and I generalize the situation by further definitions of binary relations on E representing the relationships observed above.
(Visualize by help of Figure 1 .) Now a S b is to mean that a overlaps b, the other way round, or just that a and b overlap, however you like; 28 c SP b is to mean that c begins earlier than b; and a P S c is to mean that a ends earlier than c. 29 An event a will be called an SP -minimal element of a subset A of E, if a ∈ A and there is no b ∈ A such that b SP a. "Dually", 30 an event a will be called a P S-maximal element of A, if a ∈ A and there is no b ∈ A such that a P S b. 31 The relations on E defined just before make it easier to define the notion of 'having a first [last, resp.] instant' in one line, which in [43] plays in important role for the question of the existence of instants. This notion is vital for formulating answers to all my questions but one as well. To enable the reader to make sense of my definitions following, I precede an outline of Russell's [43] discovery in terms of his philosophical interpretation.
Call an event b a contemporary of some event a whenever they overlap (purely mathematically: a S b). Call b an initial contempory of a if additionally a does not begin earlier than b (not a SP b). Now Russell found out 26 If such an a exists, it is an element of E by the definition of a related set or, sufficing as well, by the definition of S. 27 Of course, SP and P S are just the compositions of the binary relations P and S and vice versa, resp., in the sense of [17, p. 3] .
28 Note: a S b if and only if {a, b} is an antichain; and a subset A of E is an antichain if and only if a S b for all a, b ∈ A.
29 I am nothing but reporting some notation and terminology introduced by Russell in [43] .-E, P, SP, P S is now an 'event ordering' in the sense of Thomason [46, Definition 1] . 30 The notion of 'duality' can by made rather precise, cf. [2, p. 13]. I could have made it quite precise if I had introduced a formal language. Without, just think of the dual of a "statement" (or a "condition") as the result of interchanging the event symbols on both sides of P , if P is the only relation symbol (besides =) occuring and if conjunctions are "written out" instead of using "chain notation". Using "chain notation" for conjunctions, consider a one-term conjunction a "conjunction chain" as well; then the dual is the result of reversing all "conjunction chains"-still if no symbols for derived notions occur. Otherwise, S remains unchanged, while SP is replaced by P S and vice versa, and 'SP -minimal' is replaced by 'P S-maximal' and vice versa. Finally the symbol ∃− introduced soon has to be replaced by ∃+ and vice versa.
31 SP -minimal and P S-maximal elements may exist because, by Lemma 1 below, SP and (dually) P S are irreflexive.
that an event e has a first instant (i.e., there is a T -least maximal antichain containing e) if and only if (keep the following in mind for a moment), whenever e begins earlier than some event a, this a is wholly preceded by some initial contemporary of e. (In this case, the set of initial contemporaries of e is that first instant.)
To make mathematical use of the notion of 'having a first instant', I introduce a symbol denoting its extension (as far as E is concerned):
So e ∈ ∃ − "philosophically" means that e has a first instant. 32 Dually, ∃ + := { e ∈ E | whenever a P S e, a P b (S \ P S) e for some b } contains all events having a last instant.
(However, I am not quite sure about whether it was really Russell who found that e ∈ ∃ − if and only if e has a first instant, and about what actually Wiener contributed to the result.) 33 32 I prefer writing e ∈ ∃− (and introducing that notation) to just writing 'e has a first instant' in order to call to the reader's mind that the notion I am making use of is a purely mathematical one. Moreover, to make clear that I am answering questions "in terms of" E, P in the sense of Section 4), I want to emphasize that I am merely talking of elements e of E such that, e (S \ SP ) b P a for some b whenever e SP a; I am not begging the question by talking about maximal antichains containing e. 33 Russell once claimed the result was his own, but his references indicate the possibility of him only having conjectured it, while it was Wiener who found the proof. To be precise:
(i) At the beginning of [43] , Russell credits Wiener [49] with having shown what conditions are necessary in order that maximal antichains should form a linearly ordered set as outlined above. By his next sentence, Russell claims he (himself) had shown that every event has a first instant 'if' it satisfies the condition stated above and defining ∃−-referring to his [42] . A few pages behind, he proves the converse.
(ii) Russell's [42, Lecture IV], however, where the subject is discussed, offers no mathematical proof of anything. Instead, one paragraph only claims '[i]t will be found' that the condition ensures an event occuring at the set of its initial contemporaries as its first instant. 'For a mathematico-logical treatment', a footnote refers to Wiener's [49] ! (iii) In [49, p. 447f.], Wiener proves that, if an event satisfies the condition, then the set of its initial contemporaries is a maximal antichain containing that event (i.e., what Russell claimed to have shown). In advance, Wiener ascribes to Russell just having formulated the condition.
What both Russell and Wiener tell concerning priority could perhaps be reconciled by another possibility, viz., that Russell did prove the equivalence of his condition on an event to the latter having a first instant earlier than Wiener, but without publishing his formal work at that time; while Wiener's [49] proof followed quite different lines. This guess rests on the footnote of [49, p. 441] , where Wiener tells that the paper (as a whole) resulted from attempting to simplify and generalize what Russell had done so far. The fact that Russell in [43] referred wrongly to his [42] then might be some "inaccuracy" or "slip of memory", which I, however, hardly can conceive in the light of the editor's (R. C. Marsh's) Preface to the collection to which [43] belongs: 'Lord Russell has been consulted on all 7 Solutions.
Non-constructive 34 assumptions used. As a whole, the ensuing answers to the questions asked in sections 4 and 5 assume the axiom of choice or, at least, the principle of countable choice 35 and that every antichain (in our E, P ) of at most 2 elements extends to a maximal antichain. Theorem 1, however, needs the latter assumption for singletons in place of antichains only, and non-voidness of L (Section 3) merely means existence of a maximal antichain with no regard to what elements of E it should contain.-I call E, P n-maximizing if every antichain of at most n elements extends to a maximal antichain; the assumptions mentioned before refer to this for n = 2, 1, 0, respectively. 36 -Moreover, the condition of Theorem 3 characterizing separability of L, T implies that E, P is 2-maximizing and thus (whenever assumed) removes any reliance on a non-constructive principle as far as existence of maximal antichains is concerned ; in particular, no maximizingness assumption is involved in sufficiency of the characterization of real intervals.-Now, I believe that ' E, P is 2-maximizing' or any of some other consequences of the axiom of choice discussed in Subsection 8.2 below does not imply the principle of countable choice. In case this belief is correct, it is important to note that the latter principle is used for both directions of Theorem 3. Under the previous separability assumption on E, P it remains the only non-constructive principle underlying one direction of Theorem 3 and Corollary 2-I name these assumptions and the directions in which they are used in parentheses near each statement below.
Question 5 is most easily answered, so start with Theorem 1. L has more than one element if and only if P = ∅.
(This uses just that E, P is 1-maximizing for 'if'.) Answers to Questions 4a and 4b are slightly more difficult:
(a) L, T has a least element if and only if E has an SP -minimal element contained in ∃ − ("having a first instant", i.e.). (b) (dually to the previous) L, T has a greatest element if and only if E has a P S-maximal element contained in ∃ + ("having a last instant", i.e.). matters relating to the text of the papers, and these, to the best of my knowledge, are here issued in the form which he wishes to be taken as final and definitive. ' It might be noteworthy in this context that [43] , before having appeared in 1956 in the collection I am referring to, originally appeared in 1936 in the Cambridge Proceedings; while its references [42] (1st ed.) and [49] had appeared in 1914.
For distinguishing Russell's from Wiener's credits in general, cf. footnote 7 above. 34 What 'constructive' and 'non-constructive' mean here and below is rendered more precise in Subsection 8.1. For a first approximation, "constructivity" avoids the axiom of choice and any weak variant of it. 35 Cf. [29, pp. 167, 2.1]. However, this principle even has been accepted in (parts of) constructive mathematics [45] . 36 Choose an SP -maximal and a P S-minimal element from an antichain to see that E, P is n-maximizing for every non-negative integer n as soon as it is 2-maximizing.
(Both (a) and (b) use that E, P is 2-maximizing for 'only if'.)
In the following, situations like a P c S d P b are mentioned repeatedly. Such a situation is illustrated in Figure a situation, {c, d} is an antichain "in the gap" of the chain {a, b} (where a chain is a subset of E forming a loset when P is restricted to it). If E were just {a, b, c, d}, L would be {{a, d}, {c, d}, {b, c}}, and T would do {a, d} T {c, d} T {b, c}, so {c, d} would be an "instant" T -between "all" the instants containing a in one direction and "all" the instants containing b in the other.-This enables answering Question 3 as follows.
Theorem 3. L, T is separable if and only if there is a countable subset
D of E such that for all a, b ∈ P "at the same time"
(ii ) if a / ∈ ∃ + then, whenever e P S a, there are c, d ∈ D such that e P c S d P b;
(iii ) (dually to the previous condition) if b / ∈ ∃ − then, whenever b SP e, there are c, d ∈ D such that a P d S c P e.
(This uses countable choice in both directions and ' E, P is 2-maximizing' for 'only if'. In proving the theorem, I will generalize it to infinite cardinalities of dense subsets, then using the full axiom of choice.)
Here is one by-product announced in the beginning:
, L is dense in L, T ) if and only if for all a, b ∈ P such that a ∈ ∃ + and b ∈ ∃ − there are c, d ∈ E such that a P c S d P b (compare first condition in the above theorem).
(This uses that E, P is 2-maximizing for 'only if'.) The criterion "in terms of" E, P for L, T being dense given here is a weakened version of a condition stated by Russell in a footnote of [ 
This, of course, is only a sufficient, no necessary condition for L, T being dense. 38 Wiener in [49, pp. 447ff.], however, uses an additional premise to prove that L, T is dense, viz., ∃ − = E (in my terms, meaning 'every event has a first instant' as indicated in Section 6 above). Thus he does not consider (III) sufficient as I do. But Wiener uses ∃ − = E only to prove that the postulated two-element antichain "in the gap" of a two-element chain extends to a maximal antichain. By contrast, the present paper assumes maximal-antichain extendibility of any two-element antichain ( E, P 2-maximizing) from the start, so the crucial step in deriving denseness of L, T from (III) as mentioned goes without invoking Wiener's (in fact, Russell's) 39 additional premiss ∃ − = E.-In [43] , Russell presents a condition on E, P necessary for L, T being dense and a pair of conditions he claims to be sufficient. A simple counter-example presented by Anderson [1, pp. 256f.] shows that this claim is wrong. 40 As a remedy, Anderson suggests 38 To see that (III) is no necessary condition for L, T being dense, let for every pair z1, z2 of integers I(z1, z2) be the real interval { r ∈ R | z12
integer } is only "half" of R for each z2.) Then let E be the set of all these intervals and let P be the relation on E naturally deriving from <. Now, e.g., I(1, 0), I(1, 1) are P -neighbours; but L, T turns out to be isomorphic to R, < (map each real number r to the set of "events" containing r) and so is dense, since R, < is dense. (No "event" as chosen like this has a first instant, since there are no initial contemporaries ending earlier, but lots of contemporaries beginning later. Replacing ≤ in the definition of I(z1, z2) by < would make no difference but the need to recognize that, now, each I(z1, z2) is element of that maximal antichain which contains those "events" that include z12 z 2 .) Continuing the example (forget about the variation just mentioned) shows that E, P needs not to be K-dense (cf. [6, p. 76]), which following [19] also has been called 'CAC' (chain-antichain-complete), in order that L, T be as wanted: { I(2 n − 1, −n) | n positive integer } is a chain. By the axiom of choice-but also in a constructive way-it can be extended to a maximal chain. But no such extension intersects with the maximal antichain of "events" including 1. (One constructive way of extending the chain to a maximal antichain would be adding all I(2 n − 1, −n + m) for further positive integers m; if C then is the chain obtained so far, { { r + z | r ∈ M } | M ∈ C, z integer } is a maximal chain. It intersects with no maximal antichain that corresponds to an integer.) 39 Wiener [49, p. 447 ] attributes the condition to Russell. 40 One of the conditions Russell [43] claims to be sufficient is just that E, P is 2-maximizing-the surrogate for the axiom of choice which the present paper uses as well. The other condition is that no event lasts only for an instant. This was Russell's epistemological starting point already in [42, Lecture IV] (cf. his later [44, p. 293] ). It implies the first-order condition ∆ ⊆ SP S where ∆ = { a, b ∈ E × E | a = b } and SP S is the composition of relations according to the well-known notation (cf. [17, p. 3] ) like SP and P S and-below in Subsection 8.3-P SP . The converse implication holds when E, P is 2-maximizing (Russell's first condition). ∆ ⊆ SP S has just nothing to do with linear denseness of L, T -i.e., these two conditions are independent (for the direction not dealt with by Anderson, take the rational numbers for E and T = < ∩ (E × E); then L, T = E, P is dense, though not ∆ ⊆ SP S-here S = ∆.) It should not be "supplemented" as in Kleinknecht [26] , but just ignored. (Even less one should add an assumption like [26, A1.77] which contradicts Russell's no event lasts only for an instantKleinknecht assumes that the members of each antichain t have a common part c; but if t is a maximal antichain, this event c would last for its only instant t, since all d, d overlap-for all a, b ∈ P , there is c ∈ E such that a P c P b
as an alternative to the conjunction of (III) and ∃ − = E for entailing that L, T is dense-obviously not realizing that under his [1, p. 255] assumption of the axiom of choice (which entails E, P 2-maximizing, see Subsection 8.2 below) (III) alone is a condition entailing that L, T is dense and a (much) weaker one than his own proposal.-Thus, to my knowledge, the statement of the previous corollary is new. 41 To tackle Question 2, define for every A ⊆ E U (A) := { e ∈ E | a P e for all a ∈ A };
U (A) comprises all those events that are wholly preceded by all events of A. H(A), by contrast, is some kind of "hull" of A collecting not only all those events that do not end later than some event from A (so, of course, A is a subset of H(A)), but collects even those events that do end later than all events from A, but only "non-uniformly". 42 H(A), U (A) is a pair of maximal sets of events such that all the events of the first set wholly precede all the events of the second set. Every pair with this property is ping with c overlap with all members of t [26, D1.43], so d, d ∈ t and d S d . Instead of contradiction one might derive non-existence of events; this, however, would be no better philosophically, while, more formally, Kleinknecht seems to use a "classical" second-order logic where first-order variables range over events; "classically", as opposed to free logic, existence of some event then obtains as a logical truth.)-Russell's [43] flaw looks like this: he correctly states that ∆ ⊆ SP S (consequence of no event lasts only for an instant) implies his necessary condition P ⊆ SP SP S (notation for compositions of relations like previously; Russell's wording: 'reduces' the latter condition to a true one; he explicitly acknowledges that this necessary condition is not sufficient). He provides no indication how this, together with his first condition (axiom-of-choice surrogate), could help intermediate instants to exist. Perhaps he believed that, for 2-maximizing E, P , a ∈ s ∈ L, b ∈ t ∈ L, a P b, and a SP c S d P S b ("witnesses" c, d for a SP SP S b according to P ⊆ SP SP S), {c, d} extends to a maximal antichain u such that s T u T t. Anderson's example, of course, also shows that this belief is wrong. Or could the following spurious idea have underlied the thought: if Ψ (P ⊆ SP SP S) is necessary for X (denseness of L, T ) and Φ (no event lasting for an instant only) implies Ψ, then Φ is sufficient for X as well (if Φ→Ψ and X→Ψ, then Φ→X)? Anyway, it is not quite appropriate to say-as Anderson [1, p. 256n.] does-there were an error in Russell's proof, or even to point at a single line. The line to which Anderson points is just the first one where Russell's claim occurs, after some zigzag which Russell seems to consider its proof.-More formally/precisely than in Anderson [1] , E, P is a counter-example to Russell's [43] claim when E is the set of integers and
41 [18, p. 170 ] tell that Theorem 3.4 of [17] 'provides access to conditions that are necessary and sufficient, but the matter is rather technical and we shall not pursue it here'.-I estimate Corollary 1 and its proof as much more simple than that theorem, therefore it seems unlikely that [18] could have meant the condition of my corollary. 42 I.e., b ∈ H(A) if a P c S b for all a ∈ A and some c "depending" on a, without there being a "single" c such that a P c S b for all a ∈ A.-It is also easy to see that the operator H is idempotent and monotone.
H(A), U (A) for some A ⊆ E, and the property generalizes the notion of a Dedekind cut (in the sense of [ 
(iv ) for every a ∈ H(A) there is some c neither in U (A) nor in H(A) such that a P c, and for every
(That E, P is 2-maximizing is used for 'only if' again.) To get an idea of what goes on in cases (ii ) and (iii ), the reader may look at Theorem 2. If one of them applies, the "boundary" of one of U (A) and H(A) "generates" a bound as desired for both of them, unless the events outside of U (A) and H(A) according to case (iv ) form a maximal antichain that is a bound as desired. 45 The previous theorems solve the problems formulated in Section 4 as explained in Section 5. This may still not be perfectly clear, so I give two examples in the ensuing corollary. Its first part deals with one class of instances of Question-Scheme 1*-the one Thomason seems to be interested exclusively, namely (up to isomorphism) just Question 1. The second part deals with Question 1 + which appears interesting to me. 43 That is why they came to my mind when I looked for a characterization of L, T being complete.-By [40, Lemma 2.23], for losets completeness is equivalent to Dedekind completeness, where the latter means that one of the members of every Dedekind cut contains a boundary of itself. Actually, these pairs together with the complement of the union of their members form just the triples that are instants of time in the sense of Walker 's construction according to [46] . 44 One might wonder whether an answer to a question "in terms of" E, P may quantify over sets of events. However, the problem needs too much words of explaining, so I only give the following hints to my thoughts about it: (i) The elements of L are, admittedly, sets of events-but special ones. (ii) To characterize a second-order property of L, T "in terms of" E, P , surely a second-order property of E, P should be allowed (complexities should be allowed to match). 45 Why did I put case (iv ) so much more clumsy than this explanation? Answer: in order to "stay in terms of E, P ". Otherwise, the theorem would not truely be an answer to Question 2, "in terms of" E, P . For the same (or respective) reason, I did not define e ∈ ∃− by saying 'the set of maximal antichains that contain e has a least element' (as 'first instant', i.e.).-One could object that after having quantified over subsets of E there is no more point in such asceticism. I know, however, at least one possibility to counter this objection in some terms of complexity. Corollary 2. (a) L, T is isomorphic to I, < for some non-void open real interval I (I = R, e.g.) if and only if E neither has an SP -minimal element contained in ∃ − nor a P S-maximal element contained in ∃ + , there is a countable subset D of E according to Theorem 3, and every A ⊆ E satisfies one of the cases of Theorem 4.
(b) L, T is isomorphic to I, < for some non-trivial real interval I if and only if there is a countable subset D of E according to Theorem 3, every A ⊆ E satisfies one of the cases of Theorem 4, and (if E has an SP -minimal element in ∃ − and a P S-maximal element in ∃ + ) 46 P = ∅.
(Both (a) and (b) use countable choice and, for 'only if', that E, P is 2-maximizing.)
8 Proofs.
Whereas so far I have tried to explain everything mentioned, the present section presumes some basic mathematical capabilities and, in places, some basic knowledge of axiomatic set theory as can be gained from, e.g., [27, Chapter 1] or [29] .
"Constructivity" as opposed to choice principles.
This subsection starts elaborating the remarks beginning Section 7 on what the paper particularly assumes. I explain what I claimed there on avoidability of choice and similar principles as well as the loose use of terms like 'constructive'. Neglecting a small amount of terminology used in parts of subsections 8.2 and 8.6, a reader used to apply the axiom of choice with the same ease as any other common set-theoretical principle may skip the subsection without loss.
The axiom of choice-AC for short-seems, in general, not to be questioned in nowadays' mathematics and is considered part of standard (axiomatic) set theory. 47 On the other hand, when it found broad mathematical attention for the first time nearly a hundred years ago, 48 adversaries included Peano, Borel, Lebesgue, and Baire-see [28, pp. 103ff.] or, for more, [34] . Russell only temporarily was convinced of it ([1, p. 255]) and considered special assumptions on events to guarantee existence of instants without its use (see Subsection 8.2). In the meantime, there have, at least, always been mathematicians who liked to point it out when a proof used AC or similar non-constructive existence claims. 49 Moreover, there is still some interest in 46 Otherwise P = ∅ holds anyway. 47 Accordingly, [1, pp. 254ff.] and [46, p. 87 ] use it for a "modern" treatment of instants along Russell's lines. 48 However, there was a 'prehistory' of a quarter of a century-cf. [34, pp. 5ff.] . 49 At least, it seems to be common practice at Munich University to tell first-term students of mathematics that existence of bases for all vector spaces is due to Zorn's finding proofs only using constructive existence claims, even with an intuitionistic intent-here I am alluding to constructive mathematics, see, e.g., [8] or [45] . Subsections 8.1 and 8.2 address such interests.
In axiomatic set theory, everybody knows what "set theory without the axiom of choice" is. I designate this part of set theory by ZF. 50 Subsections 8.1 and 8.2 tell something about which claims of the paper hold 'by means of ZF only'. The latter phrase will return to stress this.
Whenever the paper claims that something holds "constructively" or that a proof is "constructive", this just means that it is provable "by means of ZF only". This terminology is, definitely, not correct considering what may be understood by constructivity in mathematics. 51 I consider it justified, however, by the fact that purportedly "constructive" proofs avoid use of (ZF-)equivalents of AC ([41, p. xiv]) or of "weak versions" of it (other choice, maximality, or extension principles, some of which will be reviewed below) by presenting "definitions" the only free variables of which stand in place of things which exist by the hypothesis of the implication to be proved. 52 This is to indicate how a formal 53 proof could work. 54 Thus, when the hypothesis of a theorem asserts existence of some x such that . . . and claims respective existence of some y such that . . . , a "definition" of such a y "in terms of x" 55 suffices for "constructivity"-for holding "by means of ZF only", i.e. There is no need to specify a respective x (by any "definition"). 56 According to the beginning of Subsection 7, certain claims of the paper hold by means of ZF only. Like everywhere in set theory, the corresponding metamathematical claims will not be checked in a strict manner. The informal proofs only implicitly indicate their correctness. The specifically Lemma. And teaching the Lebesgue-measure involves telling that it is due to AC that the Lebesgue-measure cannot be defined for all bounded sets.
50 I prefer to consider ZF a purely formal theory, i.e., a certain set of formulas of some formal language of first-order predicate logic with identity, defined by a finite list of axioms and axiom-schemata; cf. [14, p. 13] or [27, p. xvi] . In the present paper, however, I cannot distinguish this formal theory from the body of informal theorems and proofs which could be formalized in "proper" ZF according to common practice (cf. [27, pp. 1f 
.]).
51 Constructive mathematics typically rejects the principle of tertium non datur which is not questioned in classical mathematics-cf. [45] . I will not check whether any proof invokes this principle.-The paper cannot address the question what 'constructive' "really" means. To my knowledge, no precise answer is agreed upon by a majority of authors, cf. [8] and [45] . 52 In spite of this "justification", I will from now on prefer 'by means of ZF only' to 'constructive'. 53 Cf. footnote 50 above. 54 My proofs of this kind may be acceptable for one or the other "constructive" mathematician-I hope so, but I have not checked this. 55 In the corresponding formal way, there typically is a defining class term containing no free variable but x; cf. [29, p. 171] .
56 Peter Schuster (the author of [45] and in this respect an expert) thinks that this feature of "relative constructivity" of some proofs may be accepted by many, though not by all exponents of constructive mathematics. metamathematical aspects of the claims of the paper are adressed in an intermediately explicit manner in Subsection 8.2, in parts of Subsection 8.6, and in the rest of the present subsection as follows.
Corollary 2 rests on (some of) Facts 1, 1* and 1 + , and so do similar claims I alluded to. My corresponding metamathematical claims rely on Meta-Fact. Facts 1, 1* and 1 + , hold by means of ZF only.
For those 'facts' (on the "object level"), I am referring to proofs to be found in the literature and to obvious variants of such proofs. For my corresponding metamathematical claim, one has to check that respective proofs can be carried out in ZF:
Proof of Meta-Fact. In each case, an isomorphism as wanted arises as a straightforward (indeed: unique) extension of an isomorphism of countable dense subchains which have no ends, obviously involving nothing more than ZF. That the construction of such a "core" isomorphism as well can be carried out by means of ZF only is to my knowledge most explicit in [36, p. 32f.] and in [5, p. 200] . 57 
Existence of Russellian instants of time.
This subsection reviews some metamathematical facts relating the basic assumption of the paper (according to the beginning of Section 7) that E, P is 2-maximizing to AC and some of its consequences 58 .
Russell, doubting AC, proposed to avoid it by E = ∃ − in [42] (like [49] , see Section 7 above) and by ' E, P is 2-maximizing' in [43] (see footnote 40 above) in order to guarantee existence of enough instants. 59 These pains and 57 Other expositions might appear-at first glance-to use the principle of dependent choices ([2, pp. 176f.], e.g.; cf. [29, pp. 168f.], [45] ). Like in Subsection 8.2, however, countability allows to well-order the codomain and so to "define" a map-cf. Russell's illustration by 'pairs of shoes vs. socks' (see [22, p. 351] ). This is obvious for all the proofs I have seen, but the "recommended" proofs in [5] and in [36] are the only ones which make the definition explicit. The latter, however, might be supplemented by the hint that f −1 there is a second map which is constructed simultaneously with f and only in the end turns out to be the inverse map of the latter.
58 Consequences by means of ZF only, i.e., as explained in Subsection 8.1 above. 59 In [43] , Russell discusses E = ∃− again, as well E = ∃+ which serves the same purpose, viz., giving an instant to each event to be "at"; moreover S \ SP S = ∅, which guarantees that there is any one instant at all (it is the negation of Thomason's [46] condition corresponding to denseness of the Walker construction). Since he neither believes in AC nor in any of his own conditions, he remains sceptical about existence of instants. He might have been happy to know that "instants" may be constructed in other ways than as maximal antichains. Such alternatives are "generalized Dedekind-cuts" as in [46] or the entirely different, though surprisingly straightforward way of [17, Sections 7.5f .]. I propose this version of "generalized Dedekind-cuts": For a ∈ E, let h(a) := { e ∈ E | not a P S e }. Then K := { t ⊆ E | h(a) ⊆ t whenever a ∈ t } might be considered the set of instants, and an event a might be considered "at" ([42, Lecture IV]) an instant t if t ∈ h(t), but possibilities of avoiding AC by first-or second-order constraints on structures of the special kind considered make "ZF only" more interesting to me than merely widespread curiosity about AC as mentioned in Subsection 8.1 above would have done.
In Subsection 8.6, I show that the characterizing condition of Theorem 3 is a similar condition on the particular structure under consideration which avoids AC in guaranteeing existence of enough instants. The present subsection deals with one further condition of this kind as well as with consequences of AC which, by contrast, generalize over all structures of the given kind.
Generalizing from E, P , a related set X, R is an interval order whenever R is irreflexive and for all x, x , y, y ∈ R either x R y or y R x . The reader will need no further help in generalizing to what an antichain in X, R is. X, R is maximizing if any antichain in X, R extends to maximal one (equally clear). It is then, of course, n-maximizing for our earlier cases n = 0, 1, 2. Let MAIO be the assumption that in every interval order there is a maximal antichain, and let MAIO be the assumption that every interval order is maximizing.
Proposition 1. By means of ZF only:
(a) MAIO is equivalent to MAIO.
(b) X, R is maximizing provided X can be well-ordered. for philosophical reasons one might assume that the interval order E, P has a countable underlying set E; and then the following conclusion from the proposition might be of interest:
Corollary A. By means of ZF only: Each interval order the underlying set of which is countable is maximizing.
Remember the Henkin completeness proof for countable first-order languages goes without AC in contrast to the case of uncountable languages?-An application will follow in Subsection 8.6. 60 a P b for no b ∈ t.-E = ∃−, as well as E = ∃+, even implies that E, P is 2-maximizing; cf. [49, p. 449] . It is, however, to restrictive: in the example in footnote 38, e.g., no event has a first instant. For an easier example take R ∪ {R}, < , where the event R has all the reals as instants, but none is a first one.-S \ SP S = ∅ is to restrictive as is seen from all open real intervals (maybe of minimum length 1), e.g. By contrast, Russell's E, P 2-maximizing is exactly the part of AC which is needed here for existence of instants. 60 The reasoning carries over to other maximality principles, like the prime ideal theorem for Boolean algebras-being equivalent to the "ultrafilter theorem"-(see below) or like the existence of maximal cliques in a graph-which indeed generalizes MAIO.
Proof of Corollary A from Proposition 1. ω, being an ordinal ([27, p. 19]), is well-ordered by ∈ and by means of ZF only. If φ is a one-to-one map from X into ω, let x ∈ X precede x ∈ X iff their φ-images behave accordingly; thus X is well-ordered.
Of course, Corollary A holds for every ordinal cardinal number (for every "aleph", cf. Subsection 8.6 below) in place of ω; but, at the moment, I cannot imagine other infinite cardinals than ω which for some philosophical reasons might be considered bounding the cardinality of the underlying set of events and, at the same time, is well-ordered by means of ZF only. 61 Proof of Proposition 1. Let X, R be some interval order and Y ⊆ X an antichain.
(a) Let Y := { y ∈ X | {y} ∪ Y is an antichain } (so Y ⊆ Y ). Then Y , R is an interval order which by assumption has a maximal antichain A. By maximality of A and the definition of Y , Y must be a subset of A. This proves one direction of the claim; the other follows trivially from the fact that ∅ trivially is an antichain.
(b) If X can be well-ordered, there is a one-to-one map φ from some ordinal α onto X \Y . Define Y β , Y β for β ∈ α by Y 0 := Y , Y β := Y β ∪{φ(β)} if this is an antichain and Y β := Y β otherwise, Y β+1 := Y β for β + 1 ∈ α, and Y β := γ∈β Y γ for limit ordinals β ∈ α. Now Y is a subset of β∈α Y β , and the latter is easily seen to be a maximal antichain. Now I am going to consider two more ZF-consequences of AC which might seem relevant for E, P 2-maximizing, in order to indicate that those assumptions about 'maximizing' are rather weak compared to AC.
Compare MAIO to Kurepa's principle 'in every poset [partially ordered set, i.e.] there is a maximal antichain' which, assuming ZF, is equivalent to AC according to [15, pp. 61ff.] . Observe that an interval order X, R is rendered a poset when R is replaced by its union with the diagonal of X × X. Since this would be a special kind of poset, I believe that Kurepa's principle-whence neither AC-cannot be derived from ZF+MAIO alone.
By [15, pp. 128, 131ff .], the assumption BPI that in every Boolean algebra there is a prime ideal (which is, as is well known, derivable from ZF+AC and equivalent to existence of a maximal ultrafilter) does not, together with ZF only, imply AC. As, assuming ZF, MAIO is equivalent to the assumption that there is some somehow special ultrafilter in every Boolean algebra of some special kind (I cannot go into more detail here), I believe that, assuming nothing but ZF, BPI and MAIO do not imply each other. This belief implies that MAIO cannot be derived from ZF alone.
By the previous content of the subsection I feel justified in assuming that E, P is 2-maximizing. I.e., the reader is invited to choose his favourite from the justifications offered-maybe believing in AC (maybe the version most properly named so and vigorously advocated by Anderson Some further notation introduced in Subsection 8.4 will indicate the role that assumptions on existence of instants play in the proofs. (ii ) Fishburn's [17, pp. 23ff., 2.4.6] offers another 'construction of time instants from events' working by means of ZF only-however, without mentioning time. 62 The same book as well as [16] present further variants using ZF only.
(iii ) Now that I have mentioned three ways of 'constructing time instants from events', one of which I told not to be considered so by its author, it may be in order to explain what a 'construction of time instants from events' generally and from a purely mathematical point of view might be.-Following [42, Lecture IV], a 'construction of time instants from events' must not only supply some loset of "instants", but must also tell for every event "at" which "instants" it occurs. To put this mathematically, fix some related set L , T , and call δ a representation of E, P in L , T if δ is a map assigning a non-void subset of L to each event e ∈ E such that a P b iff, for all s ∈ δ (a) and all t ∈ δ (b), s T t. Philosophically, e now is "at" t (with respect to representation δ ) iff t ∈ δ (e), i.e., δ (e) is the set of instants "at" which e occurs.-Now δ(e) := { s ∈ L | e ∈ s } defines a representation of E, P in the Russellian L, T . More generally, a mathematical 'construction of time instants from the events' collected in E and ordered by P should just be a related set together with a representation of E, P in that related set. 63 Indeed, the proof of [ 
This is, of course, some double composite of relations in two equivalent and well-known ways. The situation visualized in Figure 2 is just a case of a P SP b; and P SP proves to be closely related with denseness. But it even is closely related with being an interval order (I am adding something more soon needed): (d) Both e S c P e and e P c S e would contradict the definition of S.
In fact, irreflexivity of P and (W) (Wiener's [49] assumptions) could have been assumed instead of irreflexivity of P and (I). 67 To see this, firstly derive reflexivity of S from irreflexivity of P , secondly transitivity of P from (W) and reflexivity of S. Then, from a P b, c P d but not c P b, similarly to the informal reasoning right after my introduction of (I) follows b P c or b S c. a P d follows by transitivity of P in the first case and directly by (W) in the second case. Thus, the universal closure of (I) follows from (W) and irreflexivity of P .
I am going to write 's T t with witnesses a, b' if s T t, a ∈ s, b ∈ t, and a P b. By definition of T , s T t is equivalent to there being witnesses according to this convention.
For better understanding some proofs below, it may be helpful to visualize witnesses of instants as horizontal strokes crossing vertical strokes representing these instants. E.g., Figure 3 Proof. That L is non-void was decided in Subsection 8.2. s T s is excluded by the definitions of T and of an antichain-this is irreflexivity. If s, t ∈ L 67 Russell's [43] starts with another equivalent set of conditions, viz., irreflexivity of P and transitivity of P and of SP . Unfortunately, he did not fully recognize the significance of the transitivity of SP -see footnote 68 below.
do not equal, (by maximality of antichains s, t) some element a of s does not overlap some element b of t. So a P b or b P a, hence s T t or t T sthis is connectedness. (As Wiener [49, p . 446] noted, both reasonings do not require any property of P but being a binary relation on E.) Finally, let s T t with witnesses a, c and t T u with witnesses d, b; by c, d ∈ t we have a P c S d P b, so (W) yields a P b; this is transitivity of T , and, in the upshot, T linearly orders L (my original definition of linearity was redundant). (Note that irreflexivity of P has not been used at all.)
Russell [43] wrongly sketched a proof of why T should be transitive assuming another set of assumptions on E, P . 68
Further notation and Theorem 1.
In the rest of the paper, I will write 'iff' for 'if and only if', and |Z| will, as usual, denote the cardinality of the set Z. 69 Concerning existence assumptions, I will moreover abbreviate ' E, P is 2-maximizing' by '(*)'; as well, '(*)' will indicate that (*) is invoked. '(*1)' indicates that only '1-maximizing' instead of '2-maximizing' is used (cf. '(*0)' with Proposition 2). '(*⇐)' indicates that only the 'if', '(*⇒)' that only the 'only if' of an 'iff' is affected-analogues apply for (*1). '(-*)' will emphasize that a part of a statement has been invoked which does not involve any of these existence assumptions.
For R ⊆ X × Y , let me define a number of "lifts". For any set Z, let P(Z) be its power set; and then
68 This was observed by Thomason [46, p. 86] and overlooked by Anderson [1, p. 263, Note 6] . Russell claimed transitivity of T derived from transitivity of P . The following counter-example refutes this claim. Let E := {a1, a2, a3, b1, b2, b3} and P := { a1, a2 , a1, a3 , a2, a3 , b1, b2 , b1, b3 , b2, b3 }. (A four-element E would have sufficed to create the critical situation, but transitivity of P would then have been trivial, and the example might have been less illustrative.) P obviously is irreflexive and transitive. Now, among the elements of L there will be t := {a1, b2} and t := {a2, b1}, and we have t T t T t (witnesses a1, a2 and b1, b2), but not t T t; so T is not transitive.-Russell should instead have pointed at (W) and derived it using essentially his assumption of transitivity of SP (cf. footnote 67 above). This would go as follows. Let a P SP b. Assume for reductio not a P b. Then b P a or a S b. (I am now going to write compositions of relations as [17, p. 1] does.) In the first case, a S a P SP b S b P a by reflexivity of S (which derives as for Lemma 1), so a (SP )(SP )(SP ) a, and then a SP a by transitivity of SP , contradicting irreflexivity of SP . (Note that irreflexivity of SP as proved for Lemma 1 does not depend on any assumption on P , but is a consequence just of the definition of S from P .) In the second case, b S a P SP b, and this contradicts irreflexivity of SP similarly to the first case.-Equivalence of the axiom set used in [43] (footnote 67 above) to each of the two two-element axiom sets suggested above now easily obtains, as transitivity of SP is a simple consequence of (W).
69 Questioning AC raises some problems with cardinalities; then the definition of [29, p. 83, 2.2] is meant to apply.
!R and ¡ R are analogously defined as subsets of P(X) × Y such that X !R y means X × {y} ⊆ R and X ¡ R y writes (X × {y}) ∩ R = ∅ By these definitions, !(R ¡ ) indicates that existential quantification occurs in the scope of universal quantification; but where parantheses do not matter I omit them, as with !R! or R ¡¡ . As an example, now
Furthermore, I let Ry := { x ∈ X | x R y } for y ∈ Y , and dually xR : At this point, the proof of Theorem 1 (|L| > 1 iff P = ∅) seems convenient.
Proof of Theorem 1. Assume P = ∅. Then E is an antichain and, as it is the greatest subset of E, a maximal one. Every other antichain properly extends to the antichain E and thus is not maximal. So L = {E} and therefore |L| = 1. Now assume there is a, b ∈ P . V(a) (= Λ(a)) and V(b) are both nonvoid (*1) and, by Lemma 2, disjunct. Hence, a = b and |L| ≥ |{a, b}| > 1.
For an explanation of the notion of duality, cf. footnote 30 above. 71 For a formal language, of course, one could easily prove that any formal proof of some statement about E, P (using perhaps formalizations of (W) and the irreflexivity of P as axioms-note that they would be "self-dual") dualizes to a proof of the dualized statement. Without a formal language, in the sequel I will omit proofs of dual statements just because readers could easily assure themselves of them by informally dualizing the informal arguments presented explicitly (cf. [2, p. 13 
]).
70 Note that neither R! nor R ¡ depends on X or Y . The analogous remarks apply to !R and ¡ R below. 71 Changing sides in dualizing now, of course, also applies to "lift marks" as defined above, Ry becomes yR, and xR becomes Rx. By contrast, Λ and V are "self-dual".
First and last instants; Theorem 2.
This subsection is concerned with the notions of having a first or, resp., a last instant, and proves Theorem 2.
A first instant of a subset A of E is a T -least element of V(A); dually, a last instant of A is a T -greatest element of V(A). By omitting braces of singletons, it is then clear what a first or last instant of some event is. As T is a linear order (and hence asymmetric), first and last instants are unique, of course.
The statements concerning first instants I present will always be duals of the statements concerning last instants. Therefore, I each time only prove one of these two cases.
Proof. (a) One direction follows from asymmetry-which follows from transitivity and irreflexivity-, the other from connectedness of linear orders. (b) Assume there is s ∈ V(A) such that s T t with witnesses c, b. Pick a from A ∩ s. Then s ∈ Λ(a, c) and therefore a S c P b.-Now assume a SP b for some a ∈ A and some b ∈ t. Then a S c P b for some c. Choose s from Λ(a, c) (*). Then s T t by c P b, and s ∈ Λ(a) ⊆ V(A).
In Section 6 I told that, as Russell found out, 72 e ∈ ∃ − iff e has a first instant. One direction is proved in Wiener's [49] , the other in Russell's [43] . For readers who find it hard to decipher the Principia-notation (and who prefer my notation), below I outline a proof in a different style. 73 To this aim, for e ∈ E I define t − (e) := e(S \ SP ) and (dually) t + (e) := (S \ P S)e.
Lemma 4. Suppose e ∈ E.
(a) t − (e) and t + (e) are antichains having e as an element.
(b) e ∈ ∃ − iff t − (e) ( ¡ P )! eSP ; and e ∈ ∃ + iff P Se !(P ¡ ) t + (e).
(c) e ∈ ∃ − iff t − (e) ∈ L; and e ∈ ∃ + iff t + (e) ∈ L.
Proof. (a) e ∈ t − (e) ∩ t + (e) follows from reflexivity of S and irreflexivity of SP and P S. Were a, b ∈ t − (e) and a P b, then e S a P b and hence e SP b, contradicting b ∈ t − (e).
(b) These are merely restatements of my original definitions of ∃ − and ∃ + using the notation introduced in the meantime.
(c) Assume e ∈ ∃ − . By (a) the goal is to demonstrate that t − (e) is maximal as an antichain. For reductio, assume there is an a ∈ (S! t − (e)) \ t − (e). So e S a because of a S! t − (e); so from a / ∈ t − (e) follows e SP a. By (b) the latter yields t − (e) ¡ P a, and this contradicts the assumption a S! t − (e).-Now assume t − (e) ∈ L and e SP a. By (b) the goal is to demonstrate that t − (e) ¡ P a. For reductio, assume a (P ∪ S)! t − (e). But a P b ∈ t − (e) would imply e SP a P b, and, by transitivity of P , e SP b, contradicting b ∈ t − (e). So a S! t − (e), contradicting maximality of t − (e) as an antichain, since by e SP a the event a is no element of t − (e).
Proposition 3. Suppose e ∈ E and t ∈ L.
(a) t is first instant of e iff t = t − (e) ∈ L; and t is last instant of e iff t = t + (e) ∈ L. (*1⇒) (b) e ∈ ∃ − iff e has a first instant; and e ∈ ∃ + iff e has a last instant.
Proof. If t is first instant of e, then, by Lemma 3 (*1), 74 t ⊆ t − (e). As t is a maximal antichain and t − (e) is at least an antichain by Lemma 4 (a), even t = t − (e). Now t − (e) ∈ L, and by Lemma 4 (c) e ∈ ∃ − .-This was one direction of both parts of the proposition, but the remaining directions should be treated separately.
(a) Assume t − (e) ∈ L. By Lemma 4 (a) then even t − (e) ∈ Λ(e). Let t = t be another element of Λ(e). Thus, (as a maximal antichain cannot be a subset of a different one) there is b ∈ t \ t − (e). Then b S e and e SP b, and from the latter by Lemma 4 (b) follows t − (e) ¡ P b. Hence t − (e) T t ; and in the upshot, t − (e) is first instant of e.
(b) Assume e ∈ ∃ − . Then by Lemma 4 (c), t − (e) ∈ L, and by the previous, t − (e) is first instant of e.
As the characterizing notions of Theorem 2 will go on to play an important role, I introduce symbols for them:
(a) t is first instant of A iff t = t − (e) ∈ L for some SP -minimal element e of A; and t is last instant of A iff t = t + (e) ∈ L for some P S-maximal element e of A. (*⇒) 74 Using Lemma 3 for the proof so far, the proposition seems to rest on (*). However, a singleton version of Lemma 3 with A = {e} may be inserted after Lemma 4 which only needs (*1) and suffices for the present proposition. When e SP b ∈ t, one then distinguishes whether e ∈ ∃− or not. In the second case, there is some c such that e SP c P S e and c P b (cf. [43] ) which just needs (*1) to be member of some s ∈ T t.
(b) A ∈ ∃* − iff A has a first instant; and A ∈ ∃* + iff A has a last instant. (*⇐)
Proof. (I am proceeding similarly as for Proposition 3.) If t is first instant of A, then by Lemma 3 (*) there must be an SP -minimal element a of A such that a ∈ t. As t cannot be a first instant of A without being a first instant of a, by Proposition 3, t must be t − (a) ∈ L. Hence by Lemma 4 (c), a ∈ ∃ − and, finally, A ∈ ∃* − .-For the remaining:
(a) Assume t − (e) ∈ L for some SP -minimal element e of A. By Lemma 4 (a) then t − (e) ∈ V(A). Let t = t be another element of V(A). Thus, there is a b ∈ (t ∩ A) \ t − (e). b P e by reflexivity of S and SP -minimality of e would contradict b ∈ A. Thus e (S ∪ P ) b, hence e SP b and finally t − (e) T t as in the proof of Proposition 3.
(b) Assume A ∈ ∃* − . So there is an SP -minimal element e of A in ∃ − . Then by Lemma 4 (c), t − (e) ∈ L, and by the previous, t − (e) is first instant of A.
Proof of Theorem 2. Theorem 2 is that instance of Proposition 4 (b) (*⇐) (with 'iff' reversed!) where A = E.
Dense subsets; Theorem 3, Corollary 1.
For any subset D of E write
(Think of "P as witnessed by D".)
Call D quasi-dense if for all a, b ∈ P at the same time
Existence of a countable quasi-dense subset of E will in this subsection turn out to be one of the characterizing conditions. Being able to formulate this condition, I can now state what I earlier tried to announce about existence of instants.
Theorem A. By means of ZF only: If a countable subset of E is quasidense, E, P is maximizing.
75 By [17, p. 5 Theorem 2], weakly as well as linearly ordered sets are a special case of interval orders. In this special case, denseness and quasi-denseness of subsets coincide, because then all elements just have one-first and last-instant, so only the first condition from the definition of quasi-denseness is relevant, and this one reduces to the usual condition defining denseness of a subset. To show that A 0 is an antichain, assume a, b ∈ A 0 and, for reductio, a P b. By Lemma 5 and some dual supplement, there is then some c ∈ D such that a P c or c P b and c S! (A ∪ D 0 ). Therefore, c ∈ D and, since D 0 is a maximal antichain of D , P , even c ∈ D 0 . So a S c S b by definition of A 0 , contradicting a P c or c P b.
I am now inserting some auxiliary facts which will be needed in the following.
If V(a) !T t, then a P ¡ t and a (P S)! t; and if t T ! V(b), then t ¡ P b and t !(SP ) b. 76 76 Parentheses with P S and SP assure that it is the relation composites that are "lifted".
Proof. (a) follows immediately from the definitions of Λ and T .
(b) Assume V(a) !T t. Then c P a for no c ∈ t by asymmetry of T . a S! t would imply a ∈ t, contradicting the assumption and irreflexivity of T . So there is some c ∈ t ∩ aP (i.e., a P c ∈ t), and then a P c S! t which implies a (P S)! t. This proves the first statement; the other one follows dually.
Theorem 3 says that L, T is separable iff E has a countable quasi-dense subset. More generally I can prove:
Proposition 5. Let κ be an infinite cardinal. 77 L has a subset of cardinality at most κ being dense in L, T iff E has a quasi-dense subset of cardinality at most κ. 78 (*) ∈ ∃ + , definition of ∃ + yields e, c such that e P c S a. Pick s from Λ(a, c) (*). This s is an instant of a, but no last one, so there is u ∈ Λ(a) ∩ sT . Denseness yields a t such 77 The case of finiteness is somewhat trivial: a finite subset can be neither dense nor quasi-dense. (The 2002 versions of this paper were erroneous at this place.)
78 With regard to my discussion of what can be obtained "by means of ZF only" and in view of [29, V.1.8] (comparability of cardinalities), 'at most' is too vague and should be understood to mean that there is a one-to-one map from such a subset of L or of E, resp., into some set cardinality of which is κ.
79 Theorem A naturally generalizes to quasi-dense D ⊆ E when κ is an aleph (see below) cardinal; so in this case (*) is entailed by the hypothesis. that s T t T u. That c s,t S d t,u obtains as before. e P c S d s,t P c s,t (by choices and by (W)) yields e P c s,t , and d t,u P c t,u S a P b yields d t,u P b.
Thus, e P c s,t S d t,u P b. (iii ) works dually to the previous case.
Having discussed non-constructive existence assumptions guaranteeing the existence of maximal antichains, I should note that, given κ, the proof uses some weaker version of the axiom of choice, viz., that there is a choice function on sets of cardinality κ ("κ-choice")-at least on such sets mentioned in the proof. Moreover, both ways round of the proof use κ 2 = κ. This is entirely constructive if κ is a well-ordered (ordinal ) cardinal, an "aleph"-see [29, p. 90, 2.32ff ., pp. 96f., 3.20f.] . If your knowledge on cardinals derives from [27, pp. 27 ], you do not know of any other cardinals, and the only problem is κ-choice. Questioning AC however, κ may be something different, as defined, e.g., in [29, p. 83] . In this case, the statement that κ 2 = κ for all infinite cardinals κ is equivalent to the full axiom of choice-see [29, p. 164, 1.14] . Now the proposition is somewhat vague about κ, and what it needs depends on how it is understood. Fortunately, Theorem 3 is a special case of the proposition looking much brighter:
Proof of Theorem 3. Theorem 3 is that special case of Proposition 5 where κ = ω (*⇒).
By [29, p. 90, 2.32, 2.33 (ii), pp. 96, 3.20ff.], ω 2 = ω by means of ZF only. So the only "parts" of AC the theorem needs are the principle of countable choice and (*). While the latter assumption follows, by Theorem A, from the hypothesis that a countable quasi-dense subset exists, it is even needed for the second part of Proposition 5. Considering the facts reported in [29, pp. 167ff ., 2.1, 2.3, 2.7] and [15, pp. 100ff ., 155ff., 160ff.], I do not expect that the principle of countable choice and any maximizingness assumption (from (*0) up to MAIO) imply each other.
Therefore, although the previous proposition made heavy use of AC, it still makes sense to track how little a part of it is needed for the central characterization results of the present paper. Now I am turning to Corollary 1.
Proof. Assume L, T is dense. Consider a, b ∈ P ∩ (∃ + × ∃ − ). So by Lemma 4 and Proposition 3 (b) (-*), t + (a) is last instant of a and t − (b) is first instant of b. From a P b follows t + (a) T t − (b). So denseness of L, T requires a t ∈ L such that t + (a) T t T t − (b). "Lastness" and "firstness" imply V(a) !T t T ! V(b), so by Lemma 6 (b) there are c, d ∈ t such that a P c S d P b.
Proof. Assume L has a subset of at most the cardinality of E dense in L, T . Then, trivially, L, T is dense, and (D) holds by Lemma 7. If (D) holds, E can be shown to be a quasi-dense subset of E, so the other way statement follows from Proposition 5 (*) (however for countable E, remember footnote fn:qudense for avoiding (*)). Indeed, (D) is just condition (i ) of the definition of quasi-denseness in the case of D = E. If a / ∈ ∃ + , consider e P S a. There is an e such that e P e S a, but because of a / ∈ ∃ + we have e P S a again. (W) and a P b together yield e P e S e P b; so condition (ii ) of the definition of quasi-denseness holds; and condition (iii ) obtains dually. 
Its proof seems to require quite a number of steps.
As to the other way round, assume for reductio a P d and not a P e for some e ∈ D. Then e P a or e S a. In the first case, transitivity of P (Lemma 1) yields e P d, and reflexivity of S furthermore yields e S e P d, contradicting SP -minimality of d. In the second case, e S a P d directly contradicts SP -minimality of d. The rest is duality.
Recall that, by the notation introduced in this section, U (D) = D !P and H(D) = P ! U (D) for every D ⊆ E. It may be helpful to compare the following lemma with propositions 3ff.
Proof. (a) follows easily from transitivity of P and from the definitions of A, B.
(b) For reductio, assume there are c, d ∈ C such that c P d. Since d / ∈ B, there is a ∈ D such that not a P d, i.e., d P a or d S a. In the first case, d P ! B by transitivity of P , so d ∈ A contradicting d ∈ C. In the second case, for every b ∈ B one gets c P d S a P b, so c P b by (W), and in the upshot, c P ! B. Therefore c ∈ A contradicting c ∈ C.
(c) By (b), I just have to show that A ∃* B is equivalent to C being maximal as an antichain. But being not maximal for C is the same as e S! C for some e ∈ E \ C, which directly contradicts A ∃* B. For the other way round, if not A ∃* B, then not a P c for some a ∈ A and every c ∈ C, or not c P b for some b ∈ B and every c ∈ C. Now, each of c P a and b P c by (a) would exclude c ∈ C, so, in fact, a S! C or C !S b, and C ∪ {a} or C ∪ {b} is an antichain properly extending C.
(d) If t ∈ L and V(A) !T t T ! V(B), then by Lemma 6 (b) and irreflexivity of P S and SP we have t ⊆ C. Since t is a maximal antichain, t = C follows from (b).-If, for the other way round, C ∈ L, then by (c) A ∃* B, and from this V(A) !T C T ! V(B) follows easily.
(e) Assume A ∃* B. I am going to show a little more than claimed, viz., that neither A can have a P S-maximal element nor B can have an SP -minimal element. For reductio, assume B has an SP -minimal element b. Allowed to by A ∃* B, pick c from C ∩ P b. By Lemma 8 now c P ! B, so c ∈ A contradicting c ∈ C. Assuming A has a P S-maximal element nearly dually leads to a contradiction-only recognize additionally D ⊆ A. 80 Lemma 10. Let M be a non-void subset of L having no T -greatest element and satisfying N := M !T = ∅. Let D := P ¡¡ M , and let then A, B, C be as in Lemma 9. Then:
Proof. (a) Fix t ∈ M . t is no T -greatest element of M , so choose t ∈ M such that t T t with witnesses a, a . So a P a ∈ t ∈ M , hence a P ¡ t ∈ M and a P ¡¡ M , i.e., a ∈ D, and from a ∈ t follows t ∈ V ( [43] only present conditions on the ordering of events concerning denseness of time and nothing else coming as close to continuity as this. Russell completely ignores the question of separability-as the discussion of change and motion usually does-cf. Subsection 9.3. Neither, Dedekind-continuity is at stake. I have no idea why Russell's distinction of which ingredients of continuumlikeness matter philosophically and which do not should be right. Like Thomason, I have dealt with the remaining ingredients; but I cannot discuss here in which respect they really matter.
Recall that the set of rational numbers, e.g., linearly ordered by <, forms, like that of the real numbers, a dense loset which, in contrast to the real numbers however, is not complete-so Russell seems to hold that a countable set of instants of time would "philosophically" do, in particular to explain motion to someone frightened by Zeno's paradoxes. Now Russell asked in [42, Lecture V]: 'Is there, in actual empirical fact, any sufficient reason to believe the world of sense continuous? ' Since he was aware of no better characterization of event structures giving rise to densitity, he tried to decide the case of private time by recurring to (III).
Having replaced Russell's Condition (III), which is sufficient but not necessary for densitity, by my characterization of density in Corollary 1, one might ask whether the situation has improved for Russell by that technical result.
Russell [42, Lecture V] concluded from his (III) 83 that the number of events conscious to one being should be infinite in any finite period of time. Unfortunately, Russell seems to never have made explicit what a finite period of time could be.
Unfortunately enough, given any instants s, t such that s < t, (infinitely iterated application of) density requires that infinitely many events start after s and before t. 84 But this follows directly from the definitions of densitity and of Russell's instants; no characterization result is involved.
Russell goes on by saying 'If this is to be the case in the world of one man's sense-data, and if each sense-datum is to have not less than a certain finite temporal extension, it will be necessary to assume that we always have an infinite number of sense-data simultaneous with any given sense-datum. ' Here, the difficulty is to understand 'not less than a certain finite temporal extension'. However, if all events simultaneous with one event e are simultaneous with each other, they comprise a single instant, the only one at which e is. In this case, e could be no sense-datum as required by Russell, since it would last for one instant only and thus have no temporal extension at all. Therefore, for a given sense-datum e there must be a preceding b, both simultaneous with e, and infinitely frequent application of (III) will verify Russell's prophecy of an infinity of events simultaneous with e.
83 (III) is just (f) as in the long footnote of [42, Lecture IV] . At the passage to which I am referring here, Russell seems just to confuse it, intending to argue from (III) and not from the curious condition actually printed there.-Moreover, Russell's discussion of conditions 'required' for something sometimes gives the impression that he had confused sufficiency and necessity of the condition for something (density, e.g.). At the presently discussed passage, however, there is no actual need for such an unfavorable interpretation. To make more clear what has already been said: Russell searches for a reason to believe in continuity, and he does not know anything else than (III) which could yield such a reason. Therefore, he discusses whether what (III) requires may be accepted. 84 The latter proposition can be made precise thus: there are infinitely many events each of which has an instant between s and t. Now, I must admit that the characterization by Corollary 1 does not yield any aleviation for Russell. Where infinitely many contemporaries of e do not come in in the way of (III), they come in as members of infinite chains of contemporaries of contemporaries of e which have no last or first instant ( [43] explains the latter phenomenon). 85 One might rescue continuous private time by "possible" (private) events, which one could have arranged just to yield "possible" density. Kamp [23, p. 376] seems to think of the same solution. 86 Russell, however, felt 'apparently forced to conclude that the space of sense-data is not continuous; but that does not prevent us from admitting that sense-data have parts which are not sense-data, and that the space of these parts may be continuous. The logical analysis we have been considering provides the apparatus for dealing with the various hypotheses, and the empirical descision between them is a problem for the psychologist.' I wonder about the psychologist, but I let that aside. I conjecture that Russell's last words on parts refer to Whitehead's treatment of space as outlined by Russell's [42, Lecture IV] before. Concerning time, Russell might as well have conceded that there are enough events giving rise to continuity without being sense-data.
Of course, density raises the same problem within the Walker framework according to Thomason's [46] . Indeed, along these lines denseness of instants is equivalent to the condition that, if a S b, then c P d for some events c, d both of which are simultaneous with both a and b. Applying this rule to e S e yields infinitely many contemporaries of e.
In the remainder of [42, Lecture V], however, Russell seems to convince himself (and some readers may agree) that no serious philosophical problem is involved by the possibility that continuity could not appear already 'in the world of one man's sense-data'. Rather, mathematical and physical time in the received sense may be found by "logical analysis" (maybe using results of the present paper), and this suffices for solving any problem lingering in the literature.
Historical understandings of 'continuum'.
'The continuum' seems to have always been a synonym for the set of the real numbers, maybe with some order or topological structure to make it a 85 E.g., let e S a P b S e. If a / ∈ ∃+, then a P c S d P b for some c, d is not required for density by Corollary 1, while it would have been required by (III), and intrusion of an infinity of contemporaries of e seems to be blocked. a / ∈ ∃+, however, implies that the events overlapping a and e are not simultaneous with each other, since otherwise they would comprise a last instant of a. Rather, there are contempories c0 and d of a and e such that c0 P d. Now a / ∈ ∃+ furthermore forces a "never ending" situation c0 P c1 P c2 P . . . cn . . . where the cn are contemporaries of a and of e. 86 Kamp even indicates Russell could sometimes have pondered this solution, but does not provide a reference.
nition of 'continuum' differs from my conception of continuity (of "lines") in (not) postulating "end" elements and in postulating only the "densenesspart" of separability, without considering minimum cardinality of a subset to which denseness could be considered "due". 89 Omitting (full) separability may have been encouraged by only considering subsets of R n or of other spaces furnished with a countable basis, for such spaces always are separable in the topological sense of the word. Indeed, dense losets are separable if and only if their associated topology is separable in the topological sense [7, Proposition 1.6.7] .
Thinking of Jordan-curves, it would have been even more throughgoing to include the possibility of time as a loop, which is a consistent possibility in cosmology according to General Relativity (linearity would get lost, then, only one-dimensionality remain-could this be handled not topologically, but by means of binary relations on the set of events? Cf. Anderson's [1, p. 259] discussion of that matter).
Continuity vs. separability and completeness.
A number of authors (Russell in [42, Lecture V] being just one of them) discusses continuity of time in the context of change and, in particular, of motion. I cannot pursue this discussion here; I just should like to remark that this discussion seems to cover denseness and completeness only, ignoring separability.
Whether separability should be considered implicated by continuity or not, it should be discussed as a property of time and, thus, as a criterion to be imposed on an adequate reconstruction. This is easy to explain to those who take it for granted that time is dense and order-embeddable into R, < . Separability of time is a necessary condition for that. 90 To those who wonder why time should be dense and embeddable into R, < , I should like to explain that if time is not separable, our measurement of it is deficient in some respect as follows. I try to sketch this explanation: 91 In principle, we measure time going by by counting some adjacent intervals of time. Of course, we choose some chain of intervals which equal in "length" (as we think). If we need greater preciseness, we use shorter intervals. We like to be able to tell how many short intervals fit into one long interval. We think we can reach arbitrary precision by dividing any "former" unit interval into a certain number of parts. This means (I think) that for any two instants of time we can determine a chain of adjacent intervals such that the two instants happen to be in different intervals. Finally we think that for any such chain of adjacent intervals and for any two instants of time, there is a finite subchain of adjacent intervals such that one instant is in the first interval and the other in the last interval of that subchain (this corresponds to the archimedian axioms of measurement theory).-If time is not separable, however, measurement of time cannot work this way. Either some countable chain of adjacent intervals does not cover all of time, or there are instants we cannot distinguish by any enhancement of precision.
So much for separability. However, the matter is not even clear concerning denseness and completeness. We have seen (Subsection 9.1) that Russell thought the "philosophical" content of continuity were just denseness. There is another "extreme" in van Benthem's [4, pp. 29ff.]-where "continuity" explicitly just is completeness. I leave it open why denseness, completeness, or both should be considered ingredients of continuity. It has thus not been cleared up what "continuumlikeness" has to do with "continuity".
9.4 Relative merits of Russell's vs. Walker's construction.
As mentioned in the beginning, Thomason [46, p. 95 ] tells: 'Thus Walker's theory offers, as Russell's does not, a plausible explanation of time as a continuum.' I object: Additionally to non-voidness of E, irreflexivity of P , and condition (I), continuumlikeness of Walker's construction as well as of Russell's construction imposes further restrictions on E, P . A 'plausible explanation of time as a continuum' requires an explanation of why these restrictions should obtain. 92 For both constructions this is, I think, not easy. Concerning that part of a 'plausible explanation of time as a continuum' only which concerns conditions on E, P necessary and sufficient for continuumlikeness of the constructed time, Walker's construction does not fare better than Russell's. This I hope to demonstrate by the ensuing two mathematical examples.
(i ) E, P might (up to isomorphism) consist of those open real intervals with rational boundaries, endowed with total precedence in the natural way. This is a case where Thomason's characterizing conditions are satisfied and the construction L , T due to Walker/Thomason is isomorphic to R, < -so we have continuumlikeness. Concerning Russell 's construction 92 Cf. the programme according to Kamp [23, p. 381 ].
Event relations beyond interval orders.
Thomason [46, 47] , van Benthem [3, 4] , and Kamp [23] advocate not to presume that the temporal relationships among events comprise an interval order. Their reasons and alternatives differ.
(i ) In [46, p. 86 ], Thomason merely pretends that a structure E, P, SP, P S somehow comes more close to Russell's presentation than a structure E, P . I do not see why. In [47, p. 50 ], Thomason remarks that in a categorytheoretic setting SP and P S carry somewhat more information than P does alone-this is interesting, and I will just admit here that I remain somewhat perplexed about it.-Finally, [47] argues that an additional primitive relation between events ('abuts') must be considered.-I would like to reply, but this would need another paper.
(ii ) Van Benthem seems as well to have strong reservations against reducing temporal relationships among events to just one relation. He uses an additional relation of "parthood". Careful analysis of his publications seems to reveal that the only reason for these reservations is a reference [3, p. 7 95 gives two reasons against the Russell/ Wiener view of temporal relations of events. One reason is his linguistical objective of "discourse representation" where knowledge in general cannot decide precedence. The other reason 96 plays the theme of vagueness where precedence cannot be decided from raw sense perception. To put forward a compromise: interval orders are a somewhat "idealized" picture of how events precede each other (or do not); at the same time, they present a somewhat "realistic" view. What some people perceive or (in another way) know about actual precedence is just another matter. 97 
